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COMMENTARY 
Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, 
Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law 
Asking the Right Question 
Frank Munger 
Marianne Constable's essay, "Genealogy and Jurisprudence,"1 brings 
the intellectual history of the law and society field within the framework of 
Nietzsche's six-stage history of metaphysics. Reorganized within that frame-
work, the work of particular law and society scholars is seen to represent 
stages of thought about the relationship between the world of appearances 
described in empirical research and the possibilities for human action. Suc-
cessive movements among law and society scholars pass, like Nietzsche's 
history of metaphysics, through stages of "error" (positivism, empiricism, 
critical legal studies, interpretive studies, constitutive theory), moving 
closer to complete acceptance of the view that action need not follow either 
legal rules or empirically described patterns and, thus, can be free. 
Constable's essay advances what is now a long line of commentary 
questioning the role of empirical research in the law and society field. Her 
essay, more clearly than many recent contributions to this literature, surely 
asks whether empirical research now has any place in studies of law and 
society.2 She argues: "The first five stages of Nietzsche's history can be 
taken to sketch the way in which jurisprudence, like metaphysics, has, 
through reason, long sought its foundations in the truths residing in a 'real 
world' ... outside of, beyond ... , and even in opposition to, 'life' in this 
world" {p. 555). She describes what she perceives as the progressive de-
throning of reason in law and society studies. First, reasoned ideals were 
Frank Munger is Professor of Law at the State University of New York at Buffalo. 
1. Marianne Constable, "Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the So-
cial Scientification of Law," 19 Law and Soc. Inquiry 551 (1994). 
2. This essay asks what law and society scholarship should be about. Many would agree 
with one of Constable's principal criticisms, namely, that law and society scholarship should 
not be about knowing an already enacted world. Criticisms have been directed at a variety of 
concerns, including normal social science methods, avoiding a dialogue with established insti· 
tutional values, and freeing perceptions of law and society from those "privileged" by normal 
science. These are different problems and could be addressed by different responses. 
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rejected by the legal realists. As social science became progressively more 
established, all reasoned aspirations were made contingent on the limits of 
"reality" and then displaced altogether by what is "possible"-all actions are 
limited, transformed, and dictated by what "is" as revealed through empiri, 
cal research.3 Yet, the social structure identified by social science is just 
another constraining artifice derived from reason. Hence, critical legal stud, 
ies, feminist jurisprudence, and constitutive theorists have rejected to a 
large degree the view that action is determined by social structure. These 
scholars' efforts represent the jurisprudence of the final liberating stage to 
the degree that they acknowledge that action springs from context, intui, 
tion, sensation, emotion, and personal moral judgment. They fail to achieve 
that stage when they suggest that human agency can (or should) be con, 
tained by rules.4 Although it is not at all clear what it means to act, let 
alone to intend or to reflect on one's intentions, in a social world in which 
an "ultimately inaccessible self,transformative force" (p. 588) is the guiding 
principle, it seems such a world would benefit little from empirical research. 
There are two ways to react to what seems to me a rather abrupt end, 
ing at the threshold of the most meaningful question posed by the essay, 
namely, What should law and society studies be about? First, one might 
defend some law and society studies (and I mean by this law and society 
studies with an empirical base) as having produced knowledge which is use, 
ful and important, and as avoiding some of Constable's concerns (I read 
criticisms generally to be her criticisms, and not just Nietzsche's 
arguments).5 
A second response might be that Constable does not take up the very 
problem that seems most important: describing what current scholarship 
fails to address and, thus, directing us more concretely toward alternative 
quests. 
My concern is different, however. Constable's insistence that there 
have been distinct (though not necessarily chronological) stages of thought 
about agency, and that each individual scholar occupies a particular stage, 
leaves us with the wrong impression and leads us to the wrong questions. 
She is both right and wrong when she says that law, and our task, should 
now be seen to be beyond reason. She is right that human action is not 
entirely a matter of reason (if by reason we mean a fixed formula for produc, 
ing "right" conclusions, correct predictions, or valid moral precepts). 
Human action may be most valuable when it is, in the words of Robin West 
3. Donald Black's work is taken to epitomize such a view. 
4. Constable points to such errors in the work of Unger, who argues at points that rules 
are needed to establish community, and in the work of Sarat and Keams, who express a fear of 
unreasoning agency. 
5. Her dissatisfactions with the most recent tum to interpretive methods and construc-
tive theory on one hand and with "normal" social science on the other, are the same, namely, 
that they ultimately view social behavior as contained and determined. 
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quoted by Constable, "grounded not in reason but in love, nurtured not in 
the head but in the heart" (p. 584). But we experience ~he social world as 
one in which our behavior and the behavior of others has continuity. When 
we extend our experience with the aid of "data collection" (whether we are 
opening trade routes to the Orient or examining the social construction of 
disability with the aid of an NSF grant), we find more continuity-differ-
ences and samenesses between ourselves and others that seem to persist. We 
are thus challenged to consider our own actions in such a world. We are not 
autonomous to change the world just as we please. We are, on the other 
hand, "free" in a very fundamental sense, to act on our perceptions (or in 
spite of them}. 
Therefore, where Constable's account seems to be in error is in its fail-
ure to recognize that one can hold these opposing understandings of the 
social world simultaneously. As she acknowledges in her introduction, the 
linearity of Nierzsche's history is artificial. But it is also possible to view 
scholars "from" Donald Black "to" Roberto Unger as possessing a more com-
plex understanding than the conventional characterization of the former as 
a positivist and the latter as a critical/constitutive theorist. As Constable 
notes, in constituting the ideal community Unger employs some familiar 
instrumentalisms. Conversely, one should not read Black's The Behavior of 
Law without careful attention to the concluding chapter, in which Black 
recognizes the possibility of future communities that will be "communal and 
situational at the same time" and where "law ... might even disappear."6 
Black's concern is, of course, as is Constable's, that we have constituted a 
world in which many futures are possible. 
The problem for Unger and Black, and for us all, lies instead in the fact 
that the production of knowledge about continuities in human behavior has 
its risks because such knowledge has the power to reproduce hierarchy, dif-
ference, and other limitations. I believe that this dilemma is inescapable, 
however, because if social science knowledge can reproduce hierarchy, so 
can Nietzschean acts of unreason.7 
The divided commitment to understanding continuity by recognizing 
and describing meaningful similarity in human experiences on the one hand 
and to subjectivity guided by moral judgment (Singer) or love (West} on 
the other seems to me to be especially strong among scholars whose careers 
began in the 1960s.8 In the context of the civil rights movement and of the 
anti-institutionalism of the antiwar movement, strong moral judgments-
and a strong sense of the desirability of an ethical and affective base for 
6. Donald J. Black, The Behavior of Law 137 (New York: Academic Press, 1976). 
7. Thus, Nietzsche is often linked with fascism, because to destroy "reason" in all its 
institutionalized forms is not to destroy existing hierarchy or power. 
8. Since the contemporary law and society movement began with the careers of these 
scholars, the tenor of law and society scholarship has been greatly influenced by the percep-
tions I am about to describe. 
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community-were motives for empirical research. The production of 
knowledge about the fact of oppression and its apparent sources in existing 
institutions seemed to be, and was often treated as, a countercultural act. 
Just as the movements failed to produce the desired changes, so the scholar, 
ship of that generation became a description of the barriers to change on 
the one hand and of increasingly complex and contingent theories of em, 
powerment on the other. 
It is not a surprise that this legacy of an earlier era of moral engage, 
ment in scholarship should now be a.source of deep ambivalence for some of 
those who produced it and a target of criticism intended not to refute it but 
to delegitimate it and to end its hold over thought. The very intellectual 
edifice advanced to direct the forces of change in the 1960s has come to be 
viewed as a barrier to full appreciation of the possibilities for human action. 
It is not surprising, then, that the terms "privileged" and "hegemonic" have 
been appropriated from the political theory of that era to describe the very 
social science methodologies that supported the theory. 
On many fronts there are contemporary expressions of concern with 
similar issues-discarding theory about structure in favor of theory about 
social construction, turning from descriptive data to narrative, interest in 
linking morality and legal validity, the rise of perspective,driven theory 
{e.g., critical race and feminist theory). Yet, as all these beginnings at the 
margin must recognize, the problems of transformation are problems of col, 
lective, not individual, action. Acts of will are fine, but how do they occur? 
They are not simply emanations of an independent moral judgment or of 
love but are always, in many important ways, socially constructed if not 
socially determined. To miss the relationship between will and the social 
construction of power is to miss the potential for racism and fascism as well 
as the potential for freedom and for fuller realization of self. To ignore the 
fact that social action is often patterned, and even predictable, and that it 
may be understood by others only because it is linked to similar experience, 
is a mistake. 
The fact that power (whether or not guided by reason) is socially con, 
structed does not invalidate what seems to me to be Constable's ultimate 
and important concern-that action be viewed as capable of transforming 
social relationships and society. The problem lies in understanding agency 
as referring simultaneously to the way an individual's behavior is implicated 
in particular patterns of behavior involving others, and to how the individ, 
ual thinks about these actions. Law and society studies must attempt to 
imagine action as it is for the individual and also to describe it as a part of 
larger patterns the individual may not see. This done, the real problem 
arises: interpreting descriptions on both levels in ways that will advance 
individual well,being by two, sometimes conflicting paths, by enabling and 
empowering the individual, and also by encouraging more humane and nur, 
turing communities and societies. 
